Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Corporate Debt Yield: An Empirical Investigation
Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Corporate Debt Yield: An Empirical Investigation
复制标题
不确定性和公司债务收益率的时间解决：实证研究
DOI：
10.1086/499136
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发表时间：
1999
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Alexander S. Reisz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Alexander S. Reisz
本文旨在根据数据衡量Reisz（1999）关于债券收益率的实证含义：公司面临的不确定性解决得越晚，对公司债务的收益率要求就应该越高。我们的研究着眼于 1987 年至 1996 年间工业企业发行的新债券。根据这个样本，我们发现强有力的证据表明，一旦违约和总体风险得到控制，不确定性解决时间延迟解决的公司会提供更高的收益率。我们还发现，公司债券的到期溢价在公司面临的不确定性时间解决（TRU）模式中是单调的。对于管理者信息不对称程度较低的公司来说，这两种结果都会得到缓解。我们还发现，TRU 延迟较多的公司对债务的依赖程度较低，并且倾向于发行短期债券。
This paper is intended to measure Reisz's (1999) empirical implication about bond yields against data: yields demanded on corporate debt should be higher the later the uncertainty facing the firm is resolved. We conduct our study looking at new bond issues made by industrial corporations between 1987 and 1996. Based on this sample, we find strong evidence that firms with more delayed resolution of uncertainty offer higher yields once default and overall risks have been controlled for. We also find that the maturity premium on corporate bonds is monotonic in the pattern of Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty (TRU) facing the firm. Both results are mitigated for firms whose managers enjoy fewer information asymmetries. We also find that firms with more delayed TRU rely less heavily on debt and tend to issue shorter-term bonds.
影响因子：
8
作者：
S. Titman;R. Wessels
通讯作者：
S. Titman;R. Wessels
影响因子：
1
作者：
MCKELVEY, RD;ZAVOINA, W
通讯作者：
ZAVOINA, W