Labor-Market Integration, Investment in Risky Human Capital, and Fiscal Competition
Labor-Market Integration, Investment in Risky Human Capital, and Fiscal Competition
复制标题
劳动力市场一体化、风险人力资本投资和财政竞争
DOI：
10.1257/aer.90.1.73
复制
发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
D. Wildasin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
D. Wildasin
本文提出了一个一般均衡模型，其中人力资本投资增加了专业化，并使技术工人面临特定地区的收入风险。技术工人的跨辖区流动减轻了这些风险；国家视情况而定的技术劳动力移民也提高了效率。通过完善的资本市场，劳动力市场一体化可以提高福利并减少事后收入不平等。相反，如果人力资本投资只能通过地方税收来融资，那么劳动力市场一体化就会导致辖区间的财政竞争，将税收负担转移到低技能的固定工人身上。人力资本投资的分散公共供给造成了收入不平等并且效率低下。
This paper presents a general-equilibrium model where human capital investment increases specialization and exposes skilled workers to region-specific earnings risk Interjurisdictional mobility of skilled labor mitigates these risks; state-contingent migration of skilled labor also improves efficiency. With perfect capital markets, labor-market integration raises welfare and reduces ex post earnings inequality. If instead human capital investment can only be financed through local taxes, labor-market integration leads to interjurisdictional fiscal competition, shifting the burden of taxation to low-skilled immobile workers. Decentralized public provision of human capital investment creates earnings inequalities and is inefficient.