Out of the Box Thoughts About the International Financial Architecture
Out of the Box Thoughts About the International Financial Architecture
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关于国际金融架构的创造性思考
DOI：
10.1142/s1793993310000044
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Barry Eichengreen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Barry Eichengreen
2008-09年的全球信贷危机凸显了改革国际金融架构的紧迫性。虽然一些短期改革已经在酝酿之中，但本文设想了未来十年可能实施的更为雄心勃勃的国际金融架构改革。它建议将国际货币基金组织份额的扩大和汇率监督的实施常规化。它考虑扩大特别提款权在国际交易中的作用，这将需要国际货币基金组织等机构充当做市商。它考虑了对商业和投资银行业重新实施类似格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案的限制的提议，这必须在国际上进行协调才可行。其他提案则要求银行购买资本保险；这里的问题是谁会在市场的另一边。国际货币基金组织可能再次发挥作用。此外，还有人主张成立新的机构或机构来处理跨境银行破产问题。任何此类实体都需要工作人员的支持，而这可能来自基金组织。最后，一些人坚持认为，国际监管机构联盟还不够，应该建立一个世界金融组织（WFO），并有权制裁其国家监管政策不符合国际标准的成员国。世界粮食组织同样需要员工支持，国际货币基金组织可能是其中之一。当然，所有这一切都以国际货币基金组织进行有意义的治理改革为前提，以便该机构具有承担这些额外责任的合法性和效率。因此，本文最后提出了一些有关国际货币基金组织治理改革的传统和非常规建议。
The Global Credit Crisis of 2008-09 has underscored the urgency of reforming the international financial architecture. While a number of short-term reforms are already in train, this paper contemplates more ambitious reforms of the international financial architecture that might be implemented over the next ten years. It proposes routinizing the expansion of IMF quotas and the conduct of exchange rate surveillance. It contemplates an expanded role for the SDR in international transactions, which would require someone-like the IMF-to act as market maker. It considers proposals for reimposing Glass-Steagall-like restrictions on commercial and investment banking, something that will have to be coordinated internationally to be feasible. Other proposals would require banks to purchase capital insurance; here the question is who would be on the other side of the market. Again there is likely to be a role for the IMF. Then there are arguments for a new agency or institution to deal with cross-border bank insolvencies. Any such entity will require staff support, which might plausibly come from the Fund. Finally, some insist that international colleges of regulators are not enough-that it is desirable to create a World Financial Organization (WFO) with the power to sanction members whose national regulatory policies are not up to international standards. A WFO will similarly need staff support, of which the IMF would be one possible source. All this of course presupposes meaningful IMF governance reform so that the institution has the legitimacy and efficiency to assume these additional responsibilities. The paper therefore concludes with some conventional and unconventional proposals for IMF governance reform.