Is Cooperation Stimulated in a Prisoner’s Dilemma by Establishing an Efficient Outcome in a Simultaneously Played Coordination Game?: An Experimental Analysis
Is Cooperation Stimulated in a Prisoner’s Dilemma by Establishing an Efficient Outcome in a Simultaneously Played Coordination Game?: An Experimental Analysis
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通过在同时进行的协调博弈中建立有效结果来刺激囚徒困境中的合作吗?:实验分析
DOI:
10.14441/eier.8.279
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发表时间:
2012
影响因子:
0.9
通讯作者:
S. Oda
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Tetsuya Kawamura;Kazuhito Ogawa;Tatsuya Kikutani;S. Oda
The bargaining process in economic and political issues such as the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) can present players with a situation wherein they engage in multiple games with their counterpart. Such a situation can be modeled as playing a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game and a Coordination Game (CG) simultaneously and repeatedly with the counterpart. Referring to the equilibrium prediction and prior experimental results, we experimentally compared the individual and mutual cooperation rates in the PD when the subjects repeatedly played only the PD game with the identical counterpart (treatment GD) and when they repeatedly and simultaneously played the PD and the CG with the identical counterpart in each round (treatment GDC). First, we found that the individual cooperation rate was higher in the GD treatment than in the GDC treatment. Second, the mutual cooperation rate was higher in the GDC treatment than in the GD treatment in the second half rounds. Thus, playing the CG initially reduced cooperation in the PD but increased mutual cooperation in the PD in the later rounds. The first result could be attributed to the subjects’ facing a more complicated situation in the GDC treatment than the GD treatment. In contrast, the second result could be attributed to the subjects’ tendency to offer similar choices between the games in the GDC treatment.