Are project-based organizations willing to learn compliance lessons from sanctioned organizations close to them? The moderating effect of knowledge base compatibility and strength of the event

Are project-based organizations willing to learn compliance lessons from sanctioned organizations close to them? The moderating effect of knowledge base compatibility and strength of the event
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DOI:
10.1016/j.ijproman.2021.06.002
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发表时间:
2021-06
影响因子:
8
通讯作者:
Zhixiu Wang;Xiaojun Yang;A. Chan;Jun Liu
Zhixiu Wang;Xiaojun Yang;A. Chan;Jun Liu
中科院分区:
管理学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Zhixiu Wang;Xiaojun Yang;A. Chan;Jun Liu

文献摘要

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对于组织违规行为的打击,以往的研究主要主张通过加大惩罚力度和加强监督来提高制裁的威慑效果。然而,在监管环境日益严峻的情况下,踩“红线”的违规行为依然猖獗。在这方面,决定一个组织从对其他组织的制裁中吸取教训的能力的因素几乎没有得到调查。针对这一问题,本研究从被制裁组织与观察组织之间的社会距离角度考察了制裁的威慑效果,并探讨了知识基础相容性以及制裁事件强度的调节作用。基于三个小插曲的实验,模拟了一个跨国项目组织在建筑业,一个典型的严重违规行业,因不遵守东道国的条例而受到制裁,经验证据表明,制裁事件的威慑作用更大的组织,更接近被制裁的组织比那些远离目标。此外,当知识库与受制裁组织的兼容性较高时,或者当制裁事件对观察组织来说更具新颖性、破坏性和关键性时,制裁的威慑作用就会扩大,观察组织也会从制裁中吸取更多的合规经验教训。基于这些研究结果,本研究有助于项目治理,并为监管机构和决策者提供了有用的战略,通过扩大制裁的威慑作用来控制违规行为。
To crack down on rule violations by organizations, previous studies have mainly advocated improving the deterrent effect of sanctions by increasing punishment and strengthening supervision. However, violations stepping on the ‘red line’ remain rampant, despite an increasingly serious regulatory environment. In this respect, factors determining an organization's ability to learn from sanctions against others have barely been investigated. To address this issue, this study investigated the deterrent effect of sanctions from the perspective of the social distance between the sanctioned organization and observing organization and explored the moderating effects of knowledge base compatibility, as well as the strength of sanction event. Empirical evidence based on three vignette-based experiments that simulated a multinational project-based organization in the construction industry, a typical industry with serious violations, was sanctioned for failure to comply with host country regulations, showed that the deterrent effect of a sanction event is greater for organizations that are closer to the sanctioned organization than for those that are far from the target. Moreover, when knowledge base compatibility with the sanctioned organization was higher or when the sanction event was more novel, disruptive and critical for observing organizations, the deterrent effect of sanctions was extended and the observing organizations learned more compliance lessons from the sanction. Based on these findings, this study contributes to project governance and provides useful strategies for regulators and policymakers to control violations by expanding the deterrent effect of sanctions.