Appearance and Illusion
Appearance and Illusion
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显现与幻觉
作者：
James Genone
关于知觉经验的表征理论和关系理论之间的近期争论有时未能阐明这两种观点在哪些方面存在差异。在本文中，我将解释关系理论拒绝大多数表征主义者所认可的两个相关主张：一是知觉经验可能出错的主张，二是具有相同表征内容是对真实知觉与现象上匹配的错觉或幻觉的不可区分性进行解释的依据这一主张。然后我将说明关系理论如何能够主张与知觉相关的错误应依据错误判断来解释，并基于表象是周围环境中物体的属性这一观点发展出一种错觉理论。我将对为什么表象有时具有误导性作出解释，最后通过说明这一观点的可行性如何削弱了激发知觉表征主义理论的最常见方式之一来得出结论。
Recent debates between representational and relational theories of perceptual experience sometimes fail to clarify in what respect the two views differ. In this essay, I explain that the relational view rejects two related claims endorsed by most representationalists: the claim that perceptual experiences can be erroneous, and the claim that having the same representational content is what explains the indiscriminability of veridical perceptions and phenomenally matching illusions or hallucinations. I then show how the relational view can claim that errors associated with perception should be explained in terms of false judgements, and develop a theory of illusions based on the idea that appearances are properties of objects in the surrounding environment. I provide an account of why appearances are sometimes misleading, and conclude by showing how the availability of this view undermines one of the most common ways of motivating representationalist theories of perception.