Artifice: Data in Disguise
Artifice: Data in Disguise
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技巧：伪装的数据
DOI：
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发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
D. Long
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Austen Barker;Yash Gupta;Sabrina Au;Eugene Chou;E. L. Miller;D. Long
- 磁盘加密技术的宽度采用，对手来说，员工强制性策略迫使用户投降加密密钥和类似的凭据，这对某些用户产生了需求。敏感信息的存在。合理的拒绝数据存储系统。为了产生与其他伪随机块无法区分的混淆载体块，然后将块上的块存储在未分配的空间中，并具有自我修复能力，并且依赖于前面的安全性。通过相对简单的块分配方案和操作安全性，可以掩盖用户运行专用系统和防止信息泄漏的能力，Artififife themand存储设备和多个快照攻击。
—With the widespread adoption of disk encryption technologies, it has become common for adversaries to employ coercive tactics to force users to surrender encryption keys and similar credentials. For some users this creates a need for hidden volumes that provide plausible deniability or the ability to deny the existence of sensitive information. Plausible deniability directly impacts groups such as democracy advocates relaying information in repressive regimes, journalists covering human rights stories in a war zone, or NGO workers hiding food shipment schedules from violent militias. All of these users would benefit from a plausibly deniable data storage system. Previous deniable storage solutions only offer pieces of an implementable solution. We introduce Artifice, the first tunable, operationally secure, self repairing, and fully deniable storage system. With Artifice, hidden data blocks are split with Shamir Secret Sharing to produce a set of obfuscated carrier blocks that are indistinguishable from other pseudo-random blocks on the disk. The blocks are then stored in unallocated space and possess a self-repairing capability and rely on combinatorial security. Unlike preceding systems, Artifice addresses problems regarding flash storage devices and multiple snapshot attacks through comparatively simple block allocation schemes and operational security. To hide the user’s ability to run a deniable system and prevent information leakage, Artifice stores its driver software separately from the hidden data.