Optimal Taxation in a Free‐entry Cournot Oligopoly: The Average Cost Function Approach
Optimal Taxation in a Free‐entry Cournot Oligopoly: The Average Cost Function Approach
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自由进入古诺寡头垄断中的最优税收：平均成本函数方法
DOI：
10.1111/caje.12598
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发表时间：
2022
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Okamura Makoto
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hamada Kojun;Ohkawa Takao;Okamura Makoto
本研究使用平均成本函数和集合博弈方法研究了在自由进入的古诺寡头垄断中，当征收特定税、从价税或两者兼而有之时的最优税收。当征收从量税或从价税时，我们得到以下结果。首先，自由进入均衡中的商业窃取(商业扩张)效应使得最优税率为正(负)。第二，最优从量税下的社会福利低于最优从价税下的社会福利。第三，当两种税都被征收时，当最初征收最优的从价税时，略微增加正从价税(负从量税)会改善社会福利。最后，特定补贴和从价税的最优组合取决于平均成本函数的形状。
This study examines the optimal taxation in a free‐entry Cournot oligopoly using the average cost function and aggregative games approach when either a specific tax, an ad valorem tax, or both, is imposed. When either a specific or an ad valorem tax is imposed, we obtain the following results. First, the business‐stealing (business‐augmenting) effect in the free‐entry equilibrium makes the optimal tax rate positive (negative). Second, social welfare under the optimal specific tax is lower than that under the optimal ad valorem tax. Third, when both taxes are imposed, marginally increasing a positive ad valorem tax (negative specific tax) improves social welfare when the optimal specific (ad valorem) tax is initially imposed. Finally, the optimal combination of a specific subsidy and ad valorem tax depends on the shape of the average cost function.