Kierkegaard lesen, gegen und mit Adorno ? Von der objektlosen Innerlichkeit zur Selbstbesinnung durch das Andere ?
Kierkegaard lesen, gegen und mit Adorno ? Von der objektlosen Innerlichkeit zur Selbstbesinnung durch das Andere ?
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克尔凯郭尔的教训,gegen und mit阿多诺?
DOI:
10.1163/24689300-bja10012
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发表时间:
2020
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Yoshida Keisuke
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
一般社団法人 日本リハビリテーション医学教育推進機構;公益社団法人 日本リハビリテーション医学会;平岡紘;佐藤 有理;上原賢司;吉田敬介;平岡紘;Yoshida Keisuke
Søren Aabye Kierkegaard’s thought has often been regarded as a philosophy of inwardness, especially within the German-speaking world. Theodor W. Adorno takes an ambivalent attitude toward this view: He criticizes Kierkegaard’s conception of subjectivity as ‘objectless inwardness’, while pointing to its potential for self-reflection that enables the subject to recognize its relationship to the outside world. Beginning from this ambivalent interpretation, this study aims to read Kierkegaard againstandwith Adorno. First, it clarifies that Kierkegaard does not remain in a closed ‘objectless’ conception of inwardness. Second, it explores how Kierkegaard conceives of inward self-reflection on remorse for sin, which is brought about through the ‘other’ and makes the subject confront its own reality. Thus, Kierkegaard’s concept of inwardness not only overcomes its objectlessness, but also implies a subjective self-reflection through the ‘other’, which can lead to social critique.