Programmable Daisychaining of Microelectrodes to Secure Bioassay IP in MEDA Biochips

Programmable Daisychaining of Microelectrodes to Secure Bioassay IP in MEDA Biochips
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DOI:
10.1109/tvlsi.2020.2967029
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发表时间:
2020-02
影响因子:
2.8
通讯作者:
Tung-Che Liang;K. Chakrabarty;R. Karri
Tung-Che Liang;K. Chakrabarty;R. Karri
中科院分区:
工程技术2区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Tung-Che Liang;K. Chakrabarty;R. Karri

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随着数字微流控生物芯片 (DMFB) 向商业开发市场过渡,安全和知识产权 (IP) 保护正在成为重要的设计考虑因素。最近的研究表明,DMFB 很容易受到旨在窃取生物分子协议(IP 盗窃)的逆向工程的影响。专有协议的知识产权盗版可能会给制药和生物技术公司带来重大损失。微电极点阵列(MEDA)是下一代DMFB平台,支持液滴实时传感,并具有重要安全保护的附加优势。然而,实时传感为攻击者窃取生化 IP 提供了机会。我们证明,微电极的菊花链和 MEDA 生物芯片中一次性可编程性的使用提供了生化协议的有效比特流加扰。为了检验该解决方案的强度,我们开发了一种基于可满足性 (SAT) 的攻击,可以通过重复观察 MEDA 平台上执行的生物测定来解读比特流。根据从 SAT 攻击中获得的见解,我们提出了针对 IP 盗窃的高级防御。使用真实生物分子协议的模拟结果证实,虽然 SAT 攻击对于简单实例是有效的,但我们的先进防御可以针对真实的 MEDA 生物芯片和真实协议来阻止它。
As digital microfluidic biochips (DMFBs) make the transition to the marketplace for commercial exploitation, security and intellectual property (IP) protection are emerging as important design considerations. Recent studies have shown that DMFBs are vulnerable to reverse engineering aimed at stealing biomolecular protocols (IP theft). The IP piracy of proprietary protocols may lead to significant losses for pharmaceutical and biotech companies. The microelectrode dot array (MEDA) is a next-generation DMFB platform that supports real-time sensing of droplets and has the added advantage of important security protection. However, real-time sensing offers opportunities to an attacker to steal the biochemical IP. We show that the daisychaining of microelectrodes and the use of one-time programmability in MEDA biochips provides effective bitstream scrambling of biochemical protocols. To examine the strength of this solution, we develop a Satisfiability (SAT)-based attack that can unscramble the bitstreams through repeated observations of bioassays executed on the MEDA platform. Based on insights gained from the SAT attack, we propose an advanced defense against IP theft. Simulation results using real-life biomolecular protocols confirm that while the SAT attack is effective for simple instances, our advanced defense can thwart it for realistic MEDA biochips and real-life protocols.