REPARAMETERIZATION OF PRISONERS DILEMMA GAME
REPARAMETERIZATION OF PRISONERS DILEMMA GAME
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DOI：
10.1002/bs.3830180605
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发表时间：
1973-01-01
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
COOMBS, CH
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
COOMBS, CH
基于风险和风险偏好理论的最新研究成果，构建了囚徒困境范式的参数化模型。冲突被投射为个人内部的风险参数和接受风险的诱因，有时分别解释为恐惧和贪婪，两者都在相对于现状的游戏水平的背景下起作用。这些对应于实验者直接控制下的独立变量。因变量是背叛倾向的强度。这些变量是在实验环境的背景下起作用的，其中包括另一个参与者的善意或敌意，这被认为只对风险变量有贡献。最后，提出了对恶劣环境下的对照研究的一些建议。
A parameterization of the prisoner's dilemma paradigm is constructed based on recent research on the theory of risk and risk preference. The conflict is cast as intrapersonal and in terms of a risk parameter and an inducement to accept the risk, sometimes interpretable as fear and greed respectively, both acting in the context of a level for the game relative to the status quo. These correspond to the independent variables directly under the control of the experimenter. The dependent variable is the strength of the tendency to defect. These variables are acting in the context of an experimental environment which includes the benevolence or hostility of another player which is assumed to contribute to the risk variable only. Some suggestions are made for the controlled study of conjoining a hostile environment.