Mere Addition and Two Trilemmas of Population Ethics
Mere Addition and Two Trilemmas of Population Ethics
复制标题
人口伦理的简单相加和两个困境
DOI：
10.1017/s0266267100003862
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发表时间：
1998
影响因子：
1.2
通讯作者：
Erik Carlson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Erik Carlson
被称为“人口理论”或“人口伦理学”的伦理学分支的一个主要目的是找到一种可信的福利主义价值论，能够比较总的结果与价值。事实证明，这是一项极其艰巨的任务。在本文中，我将陈述和讨论两个“三难困境”，或在三个不吸引人的选择之间的选择，这是人口伦理学家必须面对的。第一个三难困境并不新鲜。它起源于Derek Parfit的著名的“纯粹加法Parfit”，并由Yew-Kwang Ng首次明确提出。我将论证，这个三难困境中的一个角并不像帕菲特和其他人所声称的那样缺乏吸引力。第二个三难困境是第一个三难困境的镜像，迄今为止似乎没有被注意到。除了试图解决这两个三难困境之外，我还将提出我认为合理的福利主义价值论应该具备的某些特征。然而，这一设想的价值论的细节将是开放的。
A principal aim of the branch of ethics called ‘population theory’ or ‘population ethics’ is to find a plausible welfarist axiology, capable of comparing total outcomes with respect to value. This has proved an exceedingly difficult task. In this paper I shall state and discuss two ‘trilemmas’, or choices between three unappealing alternatives, which the population ethicist must face. The first trilemma is not new. It originates with Derek Parfit's well-known ‘Mere Addition Paradox’, and was first explicitly stated by Yew-Kwang Ng. I shall argue that one horn of this trilemma is less unattractive than Parfit and others have claimed. The second trilemma, which is a kind of mirror image of the first, appears hitherto to have gone unnoticed. Apart from attempting to resolve the two trilemmas, I shall suggest certain features which I believe a plausible welfarist axiology should possess. The details of this projected axiology will, however, be left open.