EXPERIMENTAL-EVIDENCE ON PLAYERS MODELS OF OTHER PLAYERS
EXPERIMENTAL-EVIDENCE ON PLAYERS MODELS OF OTHER PLAYERS
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DOI：
10.1016/0167-2681(94)90103-1
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发表时间：
1994-12-01
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
WILSON, PW
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
STAHL, DO;WILSON, PW
我们提出了战略思维的层次模型，并进行了一个实验，以测试这一理论以及其他解决方案的对称（3 × 3）游戏的概念。 0级类型的玩家无法预测，1级类型的玩家表现得好像其他所有人都是0级类型，2级类型的玩家表现得好像所有其他玩家都是0级和1级类型。 在级别为0的模型中，.，水平-2和纳什类型，我们估计参与者的一个微不足道的部分是0级类型，24%是1级类型，49%是2级类型，其余27%是纳什类型。
We pose a hierarchical model of strategic thinking and conduct an experiment to test this theory as well as other solution concepts for symmetric (3 x 3) games. A level-0 type plays unpredictably, a level-1 type acts as if everyone else were level-0 types, and a level-2 type acts as if all other players were level-0 and level-1 types. In a model with level-0,..., level-2, and Nash types, we estimated that an insignificant portion of the participants were level-0 types, 24% were level-1 types, 49% were level-2 types, and the remaining 27% were Nash types.