Daniel M. Smith, Dynasties and Democracy: The Inherited Incumbency Advantage in Japan Stanford University Press, 2018.
Daniel M. Smith, Dynasties and Democracy: The Inherited Incumbency Advantage in Japan Stanford University Press, 2018.
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丹尼尔·史密斯 (Daniel M. Smith)，《朝代与民主：日本继承的在职优势》斯坦福大学出版社，2018 年。
DOI：
10.1017/s1468109919000136
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发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
Sunahara Yosuke
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
浅羽祐樹;砂原庸介;浅羽祐樹・木村幹;砂原庸介;浅羽祐樹;泉英明・忽那裕樹・砂原庸介;浅羽祐樹;砂原庸介・芦谷圭祐;浅羽祐樹;砂原庸介;駒村圭吾・待鳥聡史編;Sunahara Yosuke
日本人通常会观察到王朝政治家的当选和晋升。不少日本政治观察家将日本的王朝政治解释为一种与日本传统“即”观念密切相关的文化。然而，丹尼尔·史密斯证明，政治制度，特别是选举制度和候选人选举程序，影响着日本政治王朝的主导地位，从而反驳了这种主导地位仅仅是日本本土传统和文化的反映的观点。 20世纪90年代选举制度改革后王朝政治的变化证实了史密斯书中论点的有效性。读者一定会对作者使用的大量数据印象深刻。在这本书中，史密斯的主要关注点是日本，他收集了自二战后新政权开始以来参加日本全国选举的所有候选人及其家庭关系的数据。此外，他还收集了 12 个先进民主国家的大量数据，以确定这些国家的议会成员是否来自政治王朝。收集到的宝贵数据支持了本书中对政治王朝的比较分析，并表明他提出的论点可以扩展到日本以外的其他几个民主国家。在构建王朝政治的比较理论时，史密斯区分了导致政治王朝派出遗产候选人的因素以及政党及其支持组织要求遗产候选人背后的原因。供给方因素是现任者的任期较长以及他们与政治王朝的关系。如果现任立法者的职位能够带来可代代相传的实质性利益，政治家及其家人就会试图组建一个政治王朝。尽管作者没有讨论这些利益的大小，但随着利益变大，现任政治家预计将有更强的动机去建立一个政治王朝。重要的需求方因素是现任立法者的选举优势是否会被其继任者继承。如果来自政治王朝的遗留候选人能够保持优势并有可能赢得下一次选举，政党及其支持组织就会要求她的提名。基于这一思想，史密斯深入探讨了现任者在制度、政党和个人层面的优势含义。首先，在制度层面，他指出，在以候选人为中心的选举背景下，对遗留候选人的需求将高于以政党为中心的选举背景。在以候选人为中心的选举背景下，选民可能会更重视候选人的个人赢得选票的属性（PVEA），而不是他们的政党宣言。寻求赢得选举的政党可能会选择一位拥有强大 PVEA 的传统候选人。其次，在政党层面，如果政党与民间社会组织的联系较弱，或者候选人遴选过程具有排他性和分散性，那么对传统候选人的要求就会更高。各种组织将影响政党可能用来选择非传统候选人的公开和透明的候选人选择程序。如果没有外部组织的影响，各方可能会选择被认为具有高 PVEA 的传统候选人。为了
The Japanese commonly observe dynastic politicians getting elected and promoted. Quite a few observers of Japanese politics explain the dynastic politics in Japan as a culture that is strongly related to the traditional Japanese concept of ‘ie’. However, Daniel Smith demonstrates that political institutions, especially electoral systems and candidate selection procedures, influence the dominance of political dynasties in Japan, thereby countering the view that the dominance is merely a reflection of Japan’s indigenous traditions and culture. The changes in dynastic politics after the electoral system reform during the 1990s endorses the validity of the argument made in Smith’s book. Readers will not fail to be impressed by the large amount of data utilized by the author. In this book, Smith’s primary focus is on Japan, and he collects data on all the candidates who have stood in Japanese national elections, as well as their family linkages, since the start of new political regime after World War II. Further, he collects extensive data on 12 advanced democracies to identify whether a member of parliament in these countries is from a political dynasty. The valuable data collected support the comparative analysis of political dynasties in this book and suggest that the argument he makes could be extended to several other democracies besides Japan. When building a comparative theory of dynastic politics, Smith distinguishes between the factors that lead to the fielding of a legacy candidate by a political dynasty and the reasons behind political parties and their supporting organizations demanding a legacy candidate. The supply-side factors are incumbents’ long tenures in office and their affiliations to political dynasties. Politicians and their family members would try to form a political dynasty if the position of an incumbent legislator delivers substantial benefits that can be handed down across generations. Though the author does not deal with the size of these benefits, an incumbent politician is expected to have a stronger incentive to build a political dynasty as the benefits become larger. The important demand-side factor is whether the electoral advantages of the existing legislator are inherited by his or her successor. If a legacy candidate from a political dynasty can retain the advantages and is likely to win the next election, a political party and its supporting organizations demands her nomination. Based on this idea, Smith explores in depth the meaning of an incumbent’s advantages at the system, party, and individual levels. First, at the system level, he points out that the demand for a legacy candidate will be higher in a candidate-centered electoral context than in a party-centered electoral context. In a candidate-centered electoral context, voters may place greater emphasis on the personal-vote-earning attributes (PVEA) of candidates than their party manifestos. Political parties seeking to win an election are likely to choose a legacy candidate who has strong PVEA. Next, at the party level, the demands for a legacy candidate will be higher if parties have weaker linkages to organizations in civil society, or if the candidate selection process is exclusive and decentralized. Various organizations would affect the open and transparent procedure for candidate selection that the political parties are likely to use to select non-legacy candidates. Without the influence of external organizations, parties are likely to choose legacy candidates considered to have a high PVEA. For