Marginal Returns to Schooling and Education Policy Change in Japan
Marginal Returns to Schooling and Education Policy Change in Japan
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2943908
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发表时间：
2012-05
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
C. Horioka;Nicholas Ford
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
C. Horioka;Nicholas Ford
本文分析了当有N类投标人，其估价来自不同的分布函数时，第二价格拍卖的最优保留价。卖方无法确定每个投标人的具体类型。首先，作者表明，投标人的数量影响保留价。其次，给出了最优保留价格唯一性的充分条件。第三，作者发现，如果一个投标人被一个更强的投标人取代，最优保留价可能会下降。最后，他们给出了充分的条件，确保卖方不会使用保留价，因此，拍卖将是有效的。
The authors analyze the optimal reserve price in a second price auction when there are N types of bidders whose valuations are drawn from different distribution functions. The seller cannot determine the specific type of each bidder. First, the authors show that the number of bidders affects the reserve price. Second, they give the sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the optimal reserve price. Third, the authors find that if a bidder is replaced by a stronger bidder, the optimal reserve price may decrease. Finally, they give sufficient conditions that ensure the seller will not use a reserve price; hence, the auction will be efficient.