Splitting the Difference: Modeling Appellate Court Decisions with Mixed Outcomes
Splitting the Difference: Modeling Appellate Court Decisions with Mixed Outcomes
复制标题
消除差异：对具有复杂结果的上诉法院判决进行建模
DOI：
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发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Virginia A. Hettinger
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Stefanie A. Lindquist;W. Martinek;Virginia A. Hettinger
在对特定案件做出裁决时，法官并不局限于简单地为上诉人或被告做出裁决。相反，在许多情况下，他们可以选择在一个或多个问题上为前者寻找，在一个或多个其他问题上为后者寻找。通过这样的“分裂差异”，法官可以做出在某种程度上有利于双方当事人的判决。是什么导致了这种好坏参半的结果？一些理论观点为这一现象提供了可能的解释。首先，加兰特（Galanter，1974）认为，拥有更多资源的诉讼当事人将在法庭上取得更有利的结果。当两个高资源，重复玩家诉讼人在上诉法院相遇时，这些更复杂和成功的当事人可能能够说服法院做出混合结果的判决，至少部分有利于每一方。第二，决策小组中上诉法院法官之间的战略互动可能会导致分裂的结果。在多数意见书撰写者试图容纳陪审团中的其他法官的情况下，分裂的结果有可能促使意识形态更极端的法官加入多数意见。最后，Shapiro和Stone Sweet（Stone Sweet 2000; Shapiro & Stone Sweet 2002）提出，法院有时会分裂分歧，以提高其合法性（并最终通过失去当事人来提高合规性）。例如，在一些非常突出的案件中，如果不遵守法律会更明显地威胁到法院的合法性，法官可能更有可能采取折中的办法，以安抚败诉方。我们开发了一个混合结果的实证模型，以测试这些命题使用的数据来自美国。S.上诉法院数据库，并找到支持所有三个理论观点的证据。
In rendering a decision in a particular case, judges are not limited to finding simply for the appellant or for the respondent. Rather, in many cases, they have the option to find for the former on one or more issues and for the latter on one or more other issues. By thus ‘‘splitting the difference,’’ judges can render a judgment that favors both litigants to some degree. What accounts for such mixed outcomes? Several theoretical perspectives provide potential explanations for this phenomenon. First, Galanter (1974) suggests that litigants with greater resources will achieve more favorable outcomes in the courts. Where two high-resource, repeat-player litigants meet in the appeals courts, these more sophisticated and successful parties may be able to persuade the court to render decisions with mixed outcomes that at least partially favor each party. Second, split outcomes may result from strategic interactions among the appeals court judges on the decisionmaking panel. Where majority opinion writers seek to accommodate other judges on the panel, split outcomes have the potential to serve as an inducement for more ideologically extreme judges to join the majority opinion. Finally, Shapiro and Stone Sweet (Stone Sweet 2000; Shapiro & Stone Sweet 2002) propose that courts will sometimes split the difference in order to enhance their legitimacy (and ultimately enhance compliance by losing parties). For example, in highly salient cases, where noncompliance would more clearly threaten court legitimacy, judges may be more likely to split the difference in order to mollify even the losing party. We develop an empirical model of mixed outcomes to test these propositions using data available from the U. S. Courts of Appeals Database and find evidence supportive of all three theoretical perspectives.