Ideological alignment and the distribution of public expenditures
Ideological alignment and the distribution of public expenditures
复制标题
DOI：
10.1080/01402382.2017.1395634
复制
发表时间：
2018-01-01
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
Garritzmann, Julian L.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kleider, Hanna;Roeth, Leonce;Garritzmann, Julian L.
本文回顾了有影响力的党派结盟假说，该假说假设与中央政府结盟的地方政府表现出更高的支出。为了提高自己和本党连任的机会，中央政府的政客们将更多的资源分配给在地方层面上意识形态一致的合作伙伴。因此，结盟的地方政府比不结盟的政府支出更高。本文考察了地方教育支出的一致性效应。教育是一个至关重要的测试案例，因为与其他支出不同，教育支出的分配是自由裁量的，往往没有遵循精确的公式。利用覆盖14个国家266个次国家级区域20年的新数据集，我们首次对对齐效应进行了跨国分析。控制了相互矛盾的解释，研究结果揭示了地方教育支出的一致性效应。此外，政治制度也很重要，因为在地方政府对教育政策拥有更大自由裁量权但缺乏自己的收入来源（纵向财政失衡）的国家，结盟效应更强。这些发现表明，权力下放可能会加剧教育和社会经济的不平等。
This article revisits the influential partisan alignment hypothesis, which posits that subnational governments aligned with central governments exhibit higher expenditures. To promote their own and their party's re-election chances, central government politicians allocate more resources to ideologically aligned co-partisans at the subnational level. Consequently, aligned subnational governments exhibit higher expenditures than non-aligned ones. This article examines alignment effects in subnational education spending. Education is a crucial test case because, unlike other expenditures, the allocation of education spending is discretionary and often does not follow precise formulas. Using a novel dataset covering 266 subnational regions in 14 countries over 20 years, we offer the first cross-country analysis of alignment effects. Controlling for rival explanations, the findings reveal alignment effects on subnational education expenditures. Furthermore, political institutions matter, as alignment effects are stronger in countries where subnational governments have more discretion over education policy while lacking their own revenue sources (vertical fiscal imbalance). These findings imply that decentralisation might increase educational and socio-economic inequalities.