Quantum Proofs of Deletion for Learning with Errors
Quantum Proofs of Deletion for Learning with Errors
复制标题
用于错误学习的删除量子证明
DOI:
10.48550/arxiv.2203.01610
复制
发表时间:
2022
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Alexander Poremba
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
Alexander Poremba
Quantum information has the property that measurement is an inherently destructive process. This feature is most apparent in the principle of complementarity, which states that mutually incompatible observables cannot be measured at the same time. Recent work by Broadbent and Islam (TCC 2020) builds on this aspect of quantum mechanics to realize a cryptographic notion called certified deletion. While this remarkable notion enables a classical verifier to be convinced that a (private-key) quantum ciphertext has been deleted by an untrusted party, it offers no additional layer of functionality. In this work, we augment the proof-of-deletion paradigm with fully homomorphic encryption (FHE). We construct the first fully homomorphic encryption scheme with certified deletion -- an interactive protocol which enables an untrusted quantum server to compute on encrypted data and, if requested, to simultaneously prove data deletion to a client. Our scheme has the desirable property that verification of a deletion certificate is public; meaning anyone can verify that deletion has taken place. Our main technical ingredient is an interactive protocol by which a quantum prover can convince a classical verifier that a sample from the Learning with Errors (LWE) distribution in the form of a quantum state was deleted. As an application of our protocol, we construct a Dual-Regev public-key encryption scheme with certified deletion, which we then extend towards a (leveled) FHE scheme of the same type. We introduce the notion of Gaussian-collapsing hash functions -- a special case of collapsing hash functions defined by Unruh (Eurocrypt 2016) -- and we prove the security of our schemes under the assumption that the Ajtai hash function satisfies a certain strong Gaussian-collapsing property in the presence of leakage.
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-030-77886-6_17
发表时间:
2020-05
期刊:
--
影响因子:
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作者:
P. Ananth;R. L. Placa
通讯作者:
P. Ananth;R. L. Placa
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2019
期刊:
and Cryptography 2019
影响因子:
--
作者:
Alagic, Gorjan;Jeffery, Stacey;Ozols, Maris;Poremba, Alexander
通讯作者:
Poremba, Alexander
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2023
期刊:
CRYPTO 2023
影响因子:
--
作者:
Bartusek, James;Khurana, Dakshita
通讯作者:
Khurana, Dakshita