A Maximal Domain for Stragegy-proof and No-vetoer Rules in the Multi-object Choice Model
A Maximal Domain for Stragegy-proof and No-vetoer Rules in the Multi-object Choice Model
复制标题
多对象选择模型中防策略和无否决规则的最大域
DOI：
10.1007/s00182-013-0378-6
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发表时间：
2014
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
Dolors Berga and Shigehiro Serizawa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Kantaro Hatsumi;Dolors Berga and Shigehiro Serizawa
在“Barberà et al.（1991，Econometrica 59：595-609）”之后，我们研究了代理从一组对象中选择子集的规则（或社会选择函数）。我们调查域上存在非平凡的策略证明规则。我们建立了可分离偏好集是满足防策略性和无否决性的规则存在的极大论域。
Following “Barberà et al. (1991, Econometrica 59:595–609)”, we study rules (or social choice functions) through which agents select a subset from a set of objects. We investigate domains on which there exist nontrivial strategy-proof rules. We establish that the set of separable preferences is a maximal domain for the existence of rules satisfying strategy-proofness and no-vetoer.