Does grassroots democracy reduce income inequality in China?

Does grassroots democracy reduce income inequality in China?
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DOI:
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.04.002
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发表时间:
2008-10-01
影响因子:
9.8
通讯作者:
Yao, Yang
Yao, Yang
中科院分区:
经济学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Shen, Yan;Yao, Yang

文献摘要

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本文利用1986-2002年中国8个省48个村的调查数据,研究了村级选举对村级收入分配的影响。我们估计了村内基尼系数的静态固定效应面板模型和动态面板模型,并考虑了引入选举的内生性。动态面板模型显示,选举使基尼系数减少了0.04,即样本平均值的14.3%。我们还发现,选举往往会增加贫困人口的收入份额。进一步的基于动态面板模型的计量经济分析表明,选举增加了271元的人均公共支出,但并没有提高村庄纯收入或总收入转移的水平和进度。因此,选举在缩小收入不平等方面的积极作用不是通过更多的收入再分配发挥出来的,而是通过更多有利于穷人的公共投资来发挥的。(C)2008爱思唯尔B.V.保留所有权利。
Using village and household survey data collected from 48 villages of eight Chinese provinces for the period 1986-2002, this paper studies how the introduction of village elections affects income distribution at the village level. We estimate both a static fixed-effect panel model and a dynamic panel model for the within-village Gini coefficient and take care of the endogeneity of the introduction of elections. The dynamic panel model shows that having elections reduces the Gini coefficient by 0.04, or 14.3% of the sample average. We also find that elections tend to increase the income shares of poorer portions of the population. Further econometric analysis based on dynamic panel models shows that elections increase per-capita public expenditures by 271 Yuan, but do not increase the level or progressiveness of net or total income transfer in a village. Therefore, elections' positive role in reducing income inequality is not played through more income redistribution, but through more pro-poor public investment. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.