License and entry strategies for an outside innovator in Stackelberg duopoly with royalty and fixed fee under vertical differentiation
License and entry strategies for an outside innovator in Stackelberg duopoly with royalty and fixed fee under vertical differentiation
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Stackelberg双头垄断中外部创新者的许可和进入策略，在垂直差异化下使用特许权使用费和固定费用
DOI：
10.1111/ijet.12219
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发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
0.5
通讯作者：
Masahiko Hattori and Yasuhito Tanaka
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Honjo;Y.;Ikeuchi;K.;& Nakamura;H.;Masahiko Hattori and Yasuhito Tanaka
本文研究了纵向差异化条件下Stackelberg双寡头结构下外部创新企业的选择问题。创新企业的选择是，通过特许权使用费和固定许可费的组合，在有或没有许可的情况下进入市场，以生产更高质量的产品，并在没有进入的情况下许可其技术。当创新企业将其技术许可给现有企业而不进入时，其最优专利费费率为零。当创新企业带着对现有企业的许可进入市场，且成本函数严格为凹时，其最优特许权使用费是使现有企业带着负的固定许可费用退出市场。如果成本函数是严格凸的，则存在正或负固定许可费用的正最优使用费率的内部解。在没有入口成本的情况下，如果成本函数是严格凹的，则没有许可证的入口和有许可证策略的入口是最优的，如果是严格凸的，则有许可证策略的入口是最优的。
We examine a choice of options for an outside innovating firm in Stackelberg duopoly under vertical differentiation. The options for an innovating firm are to enter the market with or without licensing its technology for producing a higher‐quality good by a combination of royalty and fixed license fee, and to license its technology without entry. When the innovating firm licenses its technology to the incumbent firm without entry, its optimal royalty rate is zero. When the innovating firm enters the market with a license to the incumbent firm, and the cost function is strictly concave, its optimal royalty rate is one such that the incumbent firm drops out of the market with a negative fixed license fee. If the cost function is strictly convex, there is an internal solution of the positive optimal royalty rate with positive or negative fixed license fee. Without entry cost, if the cost function is strictly concave, the entry without license and entry with license strategies are optimal, and if it is strictly convex, the entry with license strategy is optimal.