Revenue Non-equivalence between the English and the Second-price auctions: experimental Evidence, with Addendum: Follow up Research on Auction Design under Risk and Uncertainty
Revenue Non-equivalence between the English and the Second-price auctions: experimental Evidence, with Addendum: Follow up Research on Auction Design under Risk and Uncertainty
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英国拍卖与次价拍卖之间的收入不等价：实验证据，附附录：风险和不确定性下拍卖设计的后续研究
DOI：
10.1007/978-4-431-55501-8_14
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Chew Soo Hong and Naoko Nishimura
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
鈴木明宏;高橋広雅;竹本亨;西平直史;小川一仁;Chew Soo Hong and Naoko Nishimura
在第二价格密封投标拍卖中，当投标人对风险对象有独立的私人估值时，提交自己的估值对于非预期的公用事业投标人来说不再占主导地位。这产生了英国拍卖和非预期公用事业投标人的第二价格拍卖之间的收入等值细目。在出售单个风险物品的实验性拍卖市场中，我们发现英式拍卖比相应的二价拍卖产生更高的卖家收入。此外，在投标人表现出弱形式阿莱型行为的附加假设下，收入差异的方向得到了符合介数的非预期效用投标人的纳什均衡投标行为的支持。
Under second-price sealed bid auctions, when bidders have independent private valuations of a risky object, submitting one’s valuation is no longer dominant for non-expected utility bidders. This yields a breakdown in revenue equivalence between English auctions and second-price auctions for non-expected utility bidders. In an experimental auction market selling a single risky object, we find that an English auction yields higher seller revenue than the corresponding second-price auction. Further, the direction of revenue difference is supported by Nash equilibrium bidding behavior of betweenness-conforming non-expected utility bidders, under the additional hypothesis of bidders displaying a weak form of Allais type behavior.