Epistemic democracy with defensible premises
Epistemic democracy with defensible premises
复制标题
具有可防御前提的认知民主
DOI：
10.26481/umamet.2010066
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Kai P. Spiekermann
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
F. Dietrich;Kai P. Spiekermann
当代认知民主理论经常利用孔多塞陪审团定理来正式证明（cid：145）群体智慧（cid：146）。但该定理目前的形式并不适用，因为众所周知，它的前提之一 (cid:150) 选民独立性 (cid:150) 被违反了。这个前提对定理（cid：146）的误导性结论负有责任，即（cid：145）大量人群是绝对正确的（cid：146）。我们证明了一个更有用的陪审团定理：在可辩护的前提下，（cid：145）大群人容易犯错，但比小团体更好（cid：146）。该定理恢复了商议和教育的重要性，而这在古典陪审团框架中显得无关紧要。我们的定理与基于 de Finetti(cid:146) 定理的 Ladha(cid:146)s (1993) 开创性陪审团定理有关，用于可互换（(cid:145)indistinguishable(cid:146)）选民。我们证明了这样一个定理的更一般和更简单的版本。
The contemporary theory of epistemic democracy often draws on the Condorcet Jury Theorem to formally justify the (cid:145)wisdom of crowds(cid:146). But this theorem is inapplicable in its current form, since one of its premises (cid:150) voter independence (cid:150) is notoriously violated. This premise carries responsibility for the theorem(cid:146)s misleading conclusion that (cid:145)large crowds are infallible(cid:146). We prove a more useful jury theorem: under defensible premises, (cid:145)large crowds are fallible but better than small groups(cid:146). This theorem rehabilitates the importance of deliberation and education, which appear inessential in the classical jury framework. Our theorem is related to Ladha(cid:146)s (1993) seminal jury theorem for interchangeable ((cid:145)indistinguishable(cid:146)) voters based on de Finetti(cid:146)s Theorem. We prove a more general and simpler version of such a theorem.