Conflicts Over Property Rights and Natural Resource Exploitation at the Frontier
Conflicts Over Property Rights and Natural Resource Exploitation at the Frontier
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边境的产权冲突和自然资源开发
DOI：
10.1016/s0304-3878(01)00153-5
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发表时间：
2001
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
Louis Hotte
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Louis Hotte
通过考虑第一个定居者和竞争者之间的博弈来分析边境土地的竞争。尽管第一个定居者是一块土地的合法所有者，但他远离政府行政中心，因此很难证明这一点。这会激励参赛者对其主张提出异议。两个竞争者都将花费资源来确保所有权。由于运输成本的原因，越偏远的土地，产值越低；这往往会阻碍专有活动。土地退化有时被用来替代专用活动。较低的贴现率可能会鼓励土地退化。
Competition for land at the frontier is analyzed by considering a game between a first settler and a contestant. Although the first settler is the legitimate owner of a plot of land, his remoteness from the government's administrative center makes it difficult to prove it. This creates incentives for a contestant to dispute his claims. Both contenders will expend resources in order to secure ownership. Due to transport costs, the more remote a plot of land is, the lower its output value; this tends to discourage appropriative activities. Land degradation is sometimes used as a substitute to appropriative activities. A lower discount rate may encourage land degradation.