Justice in ideal theory: A refutation
Justice in ideal theory: A refutation
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00656.x
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发表时间：
2007-12-01
影响因子：
3.1
通讯作者：
Farrelly, Colin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Farrelly, Colin
在这篇文章中，我认为，在理想理论的层面上对正义进行理论化是有内在缺陷的，因此导致了贫穷的自由平等主义。理想理论家(错误地)认为，政治哲学家可以很容易地确定(或有特权接触到)什么是“最好的可预见条件”。此外，通过假设完全服从，理想理论家违反了现实乌托邦的约束。更具体地说，我认为，在理想理论层面发挥作用的自由平等主义者对权利采取了成本盲目的方法，并对可能的人类不幸采取了狭隘的观点。前一个问题导致自由平等主义者优先考虑基本自由平等的有序原则，或将权利视为“王牌”；而后者则优先于严格的优先原则(罗尔斯的差异原则)或运气平等主义。总而言之，对权利的成本盲目态度，加上对人类不幸的狭隘看法，意味着自由主义的平等主义正义理论无法解决在面临稀缺事实的真实非理想社会中不可避免地出现的权衡问题。这使得自由平等主义成为一种无效的社会正义理论。
In this article I argue that theorizing about justice at the level of ideal theory is inherently flawed and thus has impoverished liberal egalitarianism. Ideal theorists (falsely) assume that a political philosopher can easily determine (or has privileged access to) what constitutes the `best foreseeable conditions'. Furthermore, by assuming full compliance, ideal theorists violate the constraints of a realistic utopia. More specifically I argue that liberal egalitarians who function at the level of ideal theory adopt a cost-blind approach to rights and a narrow view of possible human misfortune. The former issue leads liberal egalitarians to give priority to a serially ordered principle of equal basic liberties or to treat rights as `trumps'; and the latter to a stringent prioritarian principle (Rawls' difference principle) or luck egalitarianism. Taken together, the cost-blind approach to rights, coupled with the narrow view of human misfortune, mean the liberal egalitarian theories of justice cannot address the issue of trade-offs that inevitably arises in real non-ideal societies that face the fact of scarcity. This makes liberal egalitarianism an ineffective theory of social justice.