Cadillac Contracts and Up-Front Payments: Efficient Investment Under Expectation Damages
Cadillac Contracts and Up-Front Payments: Efficient Investment Under Expectation Damages
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凯迪拉克合同和预付款：预期损害下的高效投资
DOI：
10.3386/w4915
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发表时间：
1994
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
A. Edlin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Edlin
本文表明，预付款可以发挥至关重要的作用，在提供有效的投资激励合同是不完整的。它们可以消除Rogerson [1984]和Shavell [1980]在法院使用预期损害救济时确定的过度投资效应。如果当事人将联合收割机预付款与我们所说的“凯迪拉克”合同（质量或数量非常高的合同）结合起来，这种方法可以扩展到复杂的合同情况。当预期损害补救措施伴随着减轻损害的广泛责任时，这种结合为复杂的合同问题提供了有效的投资激励。这表明，预期补救措施非常适合于多维度但片面的投资问题，而Edlin和Reichelstein [1993]表明，特定绩效非常适合于双边但一维的投资问题。
This paper shows that up-front payments can play a crucial role in providing efficient investment incentives when contracts are incomplete. They can eliminate the overinvestment effect identified by Rogerson [1984] and Shavell [1980] when courts use an expectation damage remedy. This method extends to complex contracting situations if parties combine up-front payments with what we call 'Cadillac' contracts (contracts for a very high quality or quantity). This combination provides efficient investment incentives in complex contracting problems when an expectation damage remedy is accompanied by a broad duty to mitigate damages. This indicates that an expectation remedy is well-suited to multidimensional, but one-sided, investment problems, in contrast to specific performance, which Edlin and Reichelstein [1993] showed is well-suited to two-sided, but unidimensional, investment problems.