Simplicity and probability in causal explanation
Simplicity and probability in causal explanation
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DOI：
10.1016/j.cogpsych.2006.09.006
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发表时间：
2007-11-01
影响因子：
2.6
通讯作者：
Lombrozo, Tania
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Lombrozo, Tania
是什么让一些解释比其他解释更好？本文探讨了简单性和概率在评价相互竞争的因果解释中的作用。四个实验研究了这样一种假设，即简单的解释被判断得更好，而且更有可能是正确的。在所有实验中，简单性被量化为解释中引用的原因的数量，更简单的解释对应的原因更少。实验一证实，在其他条件相同的情况下，更简单和更可能的解释是更可取的。实验2和实验3考察了当简单性和概率竞争时，解释是如何被评估的。数据表明，简单的解释被赋予了更高的先验概率，其结果是，在复杂的解释比更简单的替代方案更受青睐之前，需要不成比例的概率证据。此外，致力于一种简单但不太可能的解释可能会导致对简单解释中引用的原因的普遍性进行系统性高估。最后，实验4发现，当概率信息明确支持复杂的解释而不是简单的替代时，可以克服对简单解释的偏好。总而言之，这些发现表明，简单性被用作评估解释的基础，并在没有明确的概率信息时分配先验概率。更广泛地说，评估解释可以作为一种机制来产生主观概率的估计。(C)2006 Elsevier Inc.保留所有权利。
What makes some explanations better than others? This paper explores the roles of simplicity and probability in evaluating competing causal explanations. Four experiments investigate the hypothesis that simpler explanations are judged both better and more likely to be true. In all experiments, simplicity is quantified as the number of causes invoked in an explanation, with fewer causes corresponding to a simpler explanation. Experiment I confirms that all else being equal, both simpler and more probable explanations are preferred. Experiments 2 and 3 examine how explanations are evaluated when simplicity and probability compete. The data suggest that simpler explanations are assigned a higher prior probability, with the consequence that disproportionate probabilistic evidence is required before a complex explanation will be favored over a simpler alternative. Moreover, committing to a simple but unlikely explanation can lead to systematic overestimation of the prevalence of the cause invoked in the simple explanation. Finally, Experiment 4 finds that the preference for simpler explanations can be overcome when probability information unambiguously supports a complex explanation over a simpler alternative. Collectively, these findings suggest that simplicity is used as a basis for evaluating explanations and for assigning prior probabilities when unambiguous probability information is absent. More broadly, evaluating explanations may operate as a mechanism for generating estimates of subjective probability. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.