Strategy-proofness and Equal-cost Sharing for a Binary Excludable Public Good with Fixed Cost
Strategy-proofness and Equal-cost Sharing for a Binary Excludable Public Good with Fixed Cost
复制标题
固定成本二元排他性公共物品的策略验证与等成本共享
DOI：
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Arunava Sen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jordi Massó;Antonio Nicoló;Arunava Sen
对于二元公共产品的提供，我们刻画了所有防策略的社会选择函数的集合，并证明了，如果二元公共产品是可排除的并且具有固定成本，则等成本分担规则最小化了所有策略防策略和个体理性规则的最大福利损失。我们要感谢玛丽亚·安吉丽斯·德·弗鲁托斯、拉贾特·德布和埃尔维·穆林的评论。我们特别感谢大藤真司的评论和非常有帮助的建议，帮助我们写出了更好的论文。对J.Masso的研究的支持是通过加泰罗尼亚自治政府资助的ICREA学术卓越研究奖获得的。他还感谢MOVE和巴塞罗那经济研究生院(通过其研究认可计划)的支持，在那里他是一名A级研究员。他的工作还得到了西班牙科学和创新部的支持，赠款为ECO2008-04756(Grupo Consolidado-C)和Consolder-Ingenio 2010(CDS2006-00016)，加泰罗尼亚自治政府通过赠款SGR2009-419。A·尼科洛的工作得到了意大利大学和研究部2005137858美元赠款的部分支持。Y经济学部和经济学史及代码。巴塞罗那自治大学。08193贝拉特拉(巴塞罗那)，西班牙。电子邮件：jordi.masso@uab.es zDipartimento di Science Economiche。帕多瓦大学。Via del Santo 33号公路。35123，意大利帕多瓦。电子邮件：antonio.Nicolo@unipd.it新店统计研究所。7，S.J.S.Sansanwal Marg，新德里110016，印度。电子邮件：asen@isid.ac.in关键词：可排除公共产品；等成本分担；防战略；个人理性。Jel Classi：D71。
For the provision of a binary public good we characterize the set of all strategyproof social choice functions and show that, if the binary public good is excludable and has a
xed cost, the equal-cost sharing rule minimizes the maximal welfare loss among the class of all strategy-proof and individually rational rules. We want to thank Maria Angeles de Frutos, Rajat Deb and Herve Moulin for their comments. We are especially thankful to Shinji Ohseto for his comments and a very helpful suggestion that helped us to write a better paper. Support for the research of J. Masso was received through the prize ICREA Academia for excellence in research, funded by the Generalitat de Catalunya. He also acknowledges the support of MOVE, where he is an a¢ liated researcher, and of the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (through its Research Recognition Programme), where he is an a¢ liated professor. His work is also supported by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation, through grants ECO2008-04756 (Grupo Consolidado-C) and CONSOLIDER-INGENIO 2010 (CDS2006-00016), and by the Generalitat de Catalunya, through grant SGR2009-419. The work of A. Nicolo is partially supported by the Italian Ministry of University and Research, through grant 2005137858. yDepartament dEconomia i dHistoria Economica and CODE. Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona. 08193 Bellaterra (Barcelona), Spain. Email: jordi.masso@uab.es zDipartimento di Scienze Economiche. Universita degli Studi di Padova. Via del Santo 33. 35123, Padova, Italy. Email: antonio.nicolo@unipd.it xIndian Statistical Institute. 7, S.J.S. Sansanwal Marg, New Delhi 110016, India. Email: asen@isid.ac.in Keywords: Excludable Public Good; Equal-cost Sharing; Strategy-proofness; Individual Rationality. JEL Classi
cation: D71.