Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy
Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy
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威权主义与民主的精英起源
DOI：
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发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Victor Menaldo
中科院分区：
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作者：
Michael Albertus;Victor Menaldo
这本书认为，在制度设计、权力和特权的分配以及公民的生活体验方面，民主往往不会在取代威权主义后重新启动政治游戏。民主制度往往是即将卸任的威权政权设计的，目的是保护在任的精英不受法治的影响，并在民主化后给予他们相对于政治和经济的不公平优势。威权主义和《民主的精英起源》系统地记录和分析了即将离任的威权精英用来实现这些目标的宪法工具，如选举制度设计、立法任命、联邦制、法律豁免、宪法法庭设计和变革的绝对多数门槛。这项研究使用了从1800年到现在全球范围内的数据，为这些说法提供了广泛的证据。Albertus和Menaldo还对智利和瑞典进行了详细的案例研究。在这样做的过程中，他们解释了为什么一些民主国家成功地彻底修改了偏向精英的宪法，以换取更平等的社会契约。
This book argues that in terms of institutional design, the allocation of power and privilege, and the lived experiences of citizens, democracy often does not restart the political game after displacing authoritarianism. Democratic institutions are frequently designed by the outgoing authoritarian regime to shield incumbent elites from the rule of law and give them an unfair advantage over politics and the economy after democratization. Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy systematically documents and analyzes the constitutional tools that outgoing authoritarian elites use to accomplish these ends, such as electoral system design, legislative appointments, federalism, legal immunities, constitutional tribunal design, and supermajority thresholds for change. The study provides wide-ranging evidence for these claims using data that span the globe and date from 1800 to the present. Albertus and Menaldo also conduct detailed case studies of Chile and Sweden. In doing so, they explain why some democracies successfully overhaul their elite-biased constitutions for more egalitarian social contracts.