Financial Advisors: A Case of Babysitters?
Financial Advisors: A Case of Babysitters?
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1360440
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发表时间：
2009-03
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
A. Hackethal;M. Haliassos;T. Jappelli
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文献类型：
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作者：
A. Hackethal;M. Haliassos;T. Jappelli
我们使用两组数据，一组来自大型经纪公司，另一组来自大型银行，来询问：（i）财务顾问是否更有可能与贫穷，不知情的投资者或更富有，经验丰富的投资者相匹配;（ii）建议账户相对于自我管理账户的实际表现如何;（iii）独立和银行顾问的贡献是否相似。我们发现，建议帐户提供平均较低的净回报和劣质的风险回报权衡（夏普比率）。交易成本对结果有贡献，因为建议账户的成交额更高，这与佣金是顾问收入的主要来源相一致。结果是稳健的控制投资者和当地的特点。结果适用于更强大的力量，银行顾问比独立的财务顾问，银行咨询服务的更大的限制一致。
We use two data sets, one from a large brokerage and another from a major bank, to ask: (i) whether financial advisors are more likely to be matched with poorer, uninformed investors or with richer and experienced investors; (ii) how advised accounts actually perform relative to self-managed accounts; (iii) whether the contribution of independent and bank advisors is similar. We find that advised accounts offer on average lower net returns and inferior risk-return tradeoffs (Sharpe ratios). Trading costs contribute to outcomes, as advised accounts feature higher turnover, consistent with commissions being the main source of advisor income. Results are robust to controlling for investor and local area characteristics. The results apply with stronger force to bank advisors than to independent financial advisors, consistent with greater limitations on bank advisory services.