Banks' size, scope and systemic risk: What role for conflicts of interest?
Banks' size, scope and systemic risk: What role for conflicts of interest?
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.12.024
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发表时间：
2015-12-01
影响因子：
3.7
通讯作者：
Schepens, Glenn
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
De Jonghe, Olivier;Diepstraten, Maaike;Schepens, Glenn
研究表明，非利息收入对系统性风险敞口的影响随银行规模和国家制度设置的不同而不同。非利息收入降低了大银行的系统性风险敞口，而增加了小银行的系统性风险敞口。然而，通过利用各国制度设置的异质性，我们发现，大型银行创新的光明一面（多元化银行的系统性风险敞口较低）在私人信息和不对称信息较多、腐败现象较多和银行市场集中的国家消失了。这些实证发现为Saunders和Cornett（2014）的假设提供了支持，他们假设哪些制度特征更有可能使利益冲突物质化。(C) 2015 Elsevier B.V.版权所有
We show that the effect of non-interest income on systemic risk exposures varies with bank size and a country's institutional setting. Non-interest income reduces large banks' systemic risk exposures, whereas it increases that of small banks. However, exploiting heterogeneity in countries' institutional setting, we show that the bright side of innovation by large banks (lower systemic risk exposure for diversified banks) disappears in countries with more private and asymmetric information, more corruption and in concentrated banking markets. These empirical findings provide support for Saunders and Cornett (2014) who hypothesize which institutional features make the materialization of conflicts of interest more likely. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.