Fiscal Restraints and Voter Welfare
Fiscal Restraints and Voter Welfare
复制标题
财政限制和选民福利
DOI：
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.09.009
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发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
M. Smart
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
T. Besley;M. Smart
本文探讨了具有道德风险和逆向选择的政治代理模型中财政约束的逻辑。政治程序的作用既是对可能违背公共利益的现任者进行纪律处分，又是对那些最有可能为选民利益行事的政客进行分类。我们使用该模型来检验低效税收的最优性、政府规模的限制、透明度的提高以及竞争的标准。有些结论令人惊讶。例如，我们表明，只有当现任者有足够的可能是仁慈的时候，某些形式的财政紧缩才是可取的。
This paper explores the logic of fiscal restraints in a political agency model with both moral hazard and adverse selection. The role of the political process is both to discipline incumbents who may act against the public interest and to sort in those politicians who are most likely act in voters' interests. We use the model to examine the optimality of inefficient taxation, limits on the size of government, increasing transparency, and yardstick competition. Some conclusions are surprising. For example, we show that some forms of fiscal restraint can only be desirable when incumbents are sufficiently likely to be benevolent.