The Institutional Design of EMU: A Democratic Deficit?
The Institutional Design of EMU: A Democratic Deficit?
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欧洲货币联盟的制度设计：民主赤字？
作者：
A. Verdun
欧元的推出伴随着一个独立的欧洲中央银行(ECB)，它独自负责欧元区的货币政策。不会引入任何欧洲机构作为欧洲央行的侧翼。这种特殊的制度设计是有问题的。本文认为，经济与货币联盟(EMU)存在适度的民主赤字。然而，德国的情况表明，令人担忧的不是欧洲央行的独立性，而是缺乏具体的国内特征和政府。目前尚不清楚，如果EMU导致欧元区的成本和收益分配不均，将由哪个政治当局负责。经济学文献表明，在欧洲货币联盟下，扭曲很可能发生，而不同的设计可以更好地处理这些缺陷。通向动车组的历史进程解释了其特殊设计的原因。尽管不完美，但与欧洲货币联盟成立前德国事实上主导货币政策的现状相比，欧洲货币联盟是一个进步。然而，动车组的设计仍然不是最优的。
The introduction of the euro is accompanied by an independent European Central Bank (ECB) which is solely responsible for monetary policy in the euro zone. No European institution will be introduced to flank the ECB. This particular institutional design is problematic. This article argues that Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) suffers moderately from a democratic deficit. However, the case of Germany illustrates that it is not the independence of the ECB that should be cause for concern, but the absence of specific domestic features and a government. It is unclear which political authority will be held responsible if EMU leads to an uneven distribution of costs and benefits across the euro zone. Economic literature suggests that under EMU distortions could well occur and that a different design could deal better with these imperfections. The historical process leading to EMU explains the reasons for its particular design. Although imperfect, EMU is an improvement over the pre-EMU status quo in which Germany de facto dominated monetary policy. Nevertheless, the design of EMU remains suboptimal.