Attitudes De Dicto and De Se
Attitudes De Dicto and De Se
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De Dicto 和 De Se 态度
DOI：
10.2307/2184843
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发表时间：
1979
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
D. Lewis
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Lewis
如果我听到房子周围有小脚的嗒嗒声，我预计是布鲁斯。我期待的是一只猫，一只特别的猫。如果我在另一所房子里听到这样的声音，我可能会想到一只猫，但不是特定的猫。我所期待的似乎是一只迈农不完整的猫。我期待冬天，期待暴风雨天气，期待铲雪，期待疲劳——一个季节，一种现象，一种活动，一种状态。我预计有一天人类将居住在至少五个星球上。这一次我所期待的是事态的发展。如果我们以表面语法为指导，那么期望的对象就显得相当杂乱。信念也是如此，因为期望也是信念的一种。欲望也是如此：我可能想要布鲁斯，想要一只猫但没有特定的猫，想要冬天，想要暴风雨的天气，想要铲雪，想要疲劳，或者想要有一天人类将居住在至少五个星球上。对于其他态度来说也是如此，只要它们部分由信念或欲望或缺乏信念或欲望组成。但物体表面上的多样性可能只是一种幻觉。也许态度的对象在范畴上是统一的，而我们对这些统一对象的省略方式是多种多样的。这确实是我们的共识。我们大多认为态度一致以命题为对象。这就是为什么我们习惯性地谈论“命题态度”。例如，当我听到一阵窃窃私语并期待布鲁斯时，可能有也可能没有某种合理的感觉，即猫布鲁斯是我态度的对象。但是，无论如何，根据公认的观点，我的期望有一个命题对象。它针对的是一个大意是布鲁斯即将出现的提议。相反，如果我期望一只猫，但不是特定的猫，那么我期望的对象是一个不同的命题，大意是某只猫或其他猫即将出现。对于我们的其他示例也是如此。期待一只猫的例子显示了我们统一分配命题对象的政策的一个优点。如果我们不需要一只迈农不完整的猫作为这种态度的对象，那么
If I hear the patter of little feet around the house, I expect Bruce. What I expect is a cat, a particular cat. If I heard such a patter in another house, I might expect a cat but no particular cat. What I expect then seems to be a Meinongian incomplete cat. I expect winter, expect stormy weather, expect to shovel snow, expect fatigue-a season, a phenomenon, an activity, a state. I expect that someday mankind will inhabit at least five planets. This time what I expect is a state of affairs. If we let surface grammar be our guide, the objects of expectation seem quite a miscellany. The same goes for belief, since expectation is one kind of belief. The same goes for desire: I could want Bruce, want a cat but no particular cat, want winter, want stormy weather, want to shovel snow, want fatigue, or want that someday mankind will inhabit at least five planets. The same goes for other attitudes to the extent that they consist partly of beliefs or desires or lacks thereof. But the seeming diversity of objects might be an illusion. Perhaps the objects of attitudes are uniform in category, and it is our ways of speaking elliptically about these uniform objects that are diverse. That indeed is our consensus. We mostly think that the attitudes uniformly have propositions as their objects. That is why we speak habitually of "propositional attitudes." When I hear a patter and expect Bruce, for instance, there may or may not be some legitimate sense in which Bruce the cat is an object of my attitude. But, be that as it may, according to received opinion my expectation has a propositional object. It is directed upon a proposition to the effect that Bruce is about to turn up. If instead I expect a cat but no particular cat, then the object of my expectation is a different proposition to the effect that some cat or other is about to turn up. Likewise for our other examples. The case of expecting a cat shows one advantage of our policy of uniformly assigning propositional objects. If we do not need a Meinongian incomplete cat as object of this attitude, then