J-Force: Forced Execution on JavaScript

J-Force: Forced Execution on JavaScript
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J-Force:强制执行 JavaScript

DOI:
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发表时间:
2017
期刊:
The Web Conference
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Dongyan Xu
Dongyan Xu
中科院分区:
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文献类型:
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作者:
Kyungtae Kim;I. L. Kim;C. Kim;Yonghwi Kwon;Yunhui Zheng;X. Zhang;Dongyan Xu

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如今,基于Web的恶意软件配备了隐形伪装和混淆技术,变得越来越复杂。在本文中,我们提出了J-FORCE,一个无崩溃的强制JavaScript执行引擎,系统地探索可能的执行路径,并揭示此类恶意软件中的恶意行为。特别是,J-FORCE记录分支结果并使其变异以供进一步探索。J-FORCE检查可能揭示恶意意图和暴露可疑DOM注入的函数参数值。我们解决了遇到的一些技术挑战。例如,我们跟踪丢失的对象和DOM元素,并根据需要创建它们。为了验证我们的技术的有效性,我们应用J-FORCE来检测漏洞利用工具包(EK)攻击和恶意Chrome扩展。我们观察到,与现有工具相比,J-FORCE更有效。
Web-based malware equipped with stealthy cloaking and obfuscation techniques is becoming more sophisticated nowadays. In this paper, we propose J-FORCE, a crash-free forced JavaScript execution engine to systematically explore possible execution paths and reveal malicious behaviors in such malware. In particular, J-FORCE records branch outcomes and mutates them for further explorations. J-FORCE inspects function parameter values that may reveal malicious intentions and expose suspicious DOM injections. We addressed a number of technical challenges encountered. For instance, we keep track of missing objects and DOM elements, and create them on demand. To verify the efficacy of our techniques, we apply J-FORCE to detect Exploit Kit (EK) attacks and malicious Chrome extensions. We observe that J-FORCE is more effective compared to the existing tools.