Deliberation behind Closed Doors. Transparency and Lobbying in the European Union
Deliberation behind Closed Doors. Transparency and Lobbying in the European Union
复制标题
闭门商议。
DOI：
10.1057/ap.2008.30
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
1.2
通讯作者：
B. Netelenbos
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
B. Netelenbos
人们经常争辩说，欧洲联盟(欧盟)要加强其问责制和合法性，就需要变得更加透明。在闭门造车的深思熟虑中，丹尼尔·瑙林对政策制定过程中透明度的这些所谓影响进行了实证研究。这项研究的结果指出，透明度的影响并不存在，甚至与预期相反。这些结论以及用于这项实证研究的清晰和令人信服的方法，应该使这部著作成为协商民主的理论家和其他对透明度和公开性的运作感兴趣的人的基本读物。Naurin总体上区分了两种政治方法：经济竞争方法和商议方法。在经济竞争方法中，政治被概念化为固定的和竞争的偏好之间的冲突，其目的是将这些竞争的利益聚集到最佳妥协中。深思熟虑的方法认为，政治不同于这种市场行为，它是关于通过公共理性改变偏好的。根据Naurin的说法，审议理论家促进透明度和公开性，因为它将把政治论坛的规范强加于其参与者。因此，透明度将把论坛行为与市场行为区分开来。为了不同的目标，提高了透明度。它应该对精英行为产生教化作用，并增加政治决策的合法性和问责性。在这项工作中，Naurin主要感兴趣的是文明效果，即透明度促进了“符合公共利益的高质量决策”(第4页)。特别是，如果在欧盟背景下，政治制度的投入端缺乏合法性和问责制，透明度可以通过这种文明效应增强产出的合法性。应由透明度启动的两个关键规范是通信模式和通信类型。关于前者，透明度应该强加更好的论点的规范，即就讨价还价或偏好转换而不是偏好聚合展开辩论。关于后一种情况，来文的类型指向执行规范，使用他人--和理想--而不是自私的论点或理由。沟通的类型和方式是Naurin经验设计的因变量。对于独立派来说
It is often argued that for the European Union (EU) to enhance its accountability and legitimacy, it needs to become more transparent. In Deliberation behind Closed Doors, Daniel Naurin investigates empirically these supposed effects of transparency in policy-making processes. The results of this research point out that the effects of transparency are not present or even work in the contrary direction of what is expected. These conclusions and the clear and convincing methods used for this empirical research should make this work an essential reading for theorists of deliberative democracy and others interested in the workings of transparency and publicity. Naurin differentiates between two approaches to politics in general: economic competition and the deliberative approach. In economic competition approaches, politics is conceptualized as a conflict between fixed and competing preferences where the aim is to aggregate these competing interests into optimal compromises. The deliberative approach argues that politics is different from this kind of market behaviour and is about the transformation of preferences through public reason. According to Naurin, deliberative theorists promote transparency and publicity, because it will impose the norms of the political forum upon its actors. So, transparency will differentiate forum behaviour from market behaviour. Transparency is promoted for different objectives. It is supposed to have a civilizing effect on elite behaviour and to increase the legitimacy and accountability of political decision making. In this work, Naurin is interested primarily in the civilizing effect, which states that transparency promotes ‘high quality decision-making in line with the public interest’(p. 4). Especially, if there is a lack of legitimacy and accountability at the input-side of the political system in the EU context, transparency can enhance the output legitimacy through this civilizing effect. The two critical norms that should be activated by transparency are within the mode of communication and the type of communication. Concerning the former, transparency should impose the norm of the better argument, that is, arguing over bargaining or preference transformation over preference aggregation. Concerning the latter, the type of communication points to the enforcement of the norm to use other-and ideal-regarding rather than self-regarding arguments or justifications. The type and mode of communication are the dependent variables of Naurin’s empirical design. For the independent