The Method of Scientific Discovery in Peirce’s Philosophy: Deduction, Induction, and Abduction
The Method of Scientific Discovery in Peirce’s Philosophy: Deduction, Induction, and Abduction
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皮尔士哲学中的科学发现方法：演绎、归纳、溯因
DOI：
10.1007/s11787-011-0026-5
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发表时间：
2011
影响因子：
0.8
通讯作者：
Cassiano Terra Rodrigues
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Cassiano Terra Rodrigues
在本文中，我们将显示皮尔士的区别之间的演绎，归纳和溯因。本文的目的是显示皮尔士如何改变了他的观点的主题，从理解演绎，归纳和假设的推理类型，以了解他们的调查阶段非常紧密相连。为了更好地理解皮尔士在这方面的独创性，我们展示了皮尔士在定性归纳和定量归纳之间以及在理论演绎和推论演绎之间的区别，然后通过数学和逻辑之间的区别。最后，我们对皮尔士与怀特海的数学观作了一个比较，希望能对进一步的研究有所启发。
In this paper we will show Peirce’s distinction between deduction, induction and abduction. The aim of the paper is to show how Peirce changed his views on the subject, from an understanding of deduction, induction and hypotheses as types of reasoning to understanding them as stages of inquiry very tightly connected. In order to get a better understanding of Peirce’s originality on this, we show Peirce’s distinctions between qualitative and quantitative induction and between theorematical and corollarial deduction, passing then to the distinction between mathematics and logic. In the end, we propose a sketch of a comparison between Peirce and Whitehead concerning the two thinkers’ view of mathematics, hoping that this could point to further inquiries.