Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union
Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union
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DOI：
10.1162/002081802760199908
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发表时间：
2002-06
影响因子：
7.8
通讯作者：
J. Tallberg
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Tallberg
当代关于合规性的辩论围绕如何最好地使国家遵守国际规则的两种相互竞争的观点展开：执行或管理。执行理论家强调监督和制裁的强制性策略，而管理理论家则采用基于能力建设、规则解释和透明度的解决问题的方法。在本文中，我对“执行和管理是实现合规性的竞争策略”这一观点提出了质疑。根据欧盟的案例以及与其他国际制度的比较，我认为执法和管理机制相结合才是最有效的。 “管理-执法阶梯”中合作性工具和强制性工具的结合使欧盟在打击违法行为方面取得了巨大成功，从而将不遵守行为减少为暂时现象。对贸易、环境和人权领域制度的考察为这一主张提供了额外的支持；提供两种形式机制的合规系统在确保规则一致性方面特别有效，而仅依赖其中一种策略的系统会遭受明显的损失。
The contemporary debate on compliance has been framed in terms of two contending perspectives on how best to make states comply with international rules: enforcement or management. Whereas enforcement theorists stress a coercive strategy of monitoring and sanctions, management theorists embrace a problem-solving approach based on capacity building, rule interpretation, and transparency. In this article, I challenge the conception that enforcement and management are competing strategies for achieving compliance. Based on the case of the European Union (EU) and a comparison with other international regimes, I suggest that enforcement and management mechanisms are most effective when combined. The twinning of cooperative and coercive instruments in a “management-enforcement ladder” makes the EU highly successful in combating violations, thus reducing non-compliance to a temporal phenomenon. An examination of regimes in the areas of trade, environment, and human rights lends additional support to this proposition; compliance systems that offer both forms of mechanism are particularly effective in securing rule conformance, whereas systems that only rely on one of the strategies suffer in identifiable ways.