Game-theoretic analysis of trade-in services in closed-loop supply chains

Game-theoretic analysis of trade-in services in closed-loop supply chains
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DOI:
10.1016/j.tre.2021.102428
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发表时间:
2021-08
期刊:
Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Yuting Quan;Jiangtao Hong;Jingpu Song;Mingming Leng
Yuting Quan;Jiangtao Hong;Jingpu Song;Mingming Leng
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
--
作者:
Yuting Quan;Jiangtao Hong;Jingpu Song;Mingming Leng

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我们建立了一个两阶段模型来研究由制造商和零售商组成的闭环供应链中的以旧换新服务问题。在供应链中,我们考虑以旧换新服务的两种选择。第一种是场景M,制造商自己从以旧换新客户那里收集用过的产品;第二种是场景R,制造商将以回购价格从零售商那里获得的旧产品外包给零售商。因此,负责这项服务的公司需要确定退税率。我们发现,在大多数情况下,两家公司都倾向于自己经营以旧换新服务,并推导了两家公司都喜欢一种情景的条件,以及在这种情景下供应链更好的条件。与方案M相比,在方案R中,以旧换新客户可以在两个阶段享受更低的价格,尽管新客户的第二阶段销售价格更高。我们还进行了数值研究,以考察主要参数对最优价格、返利率、利润的影响,以及每个公司和供应链情景偏好的条件。当以旧换新客户对价格更敏感时,两种情况下的以旧换新价格之间的差异会更大,而当制造商从处理退货产品中获得更高的净收益时,差异会变小。
We develop a two-period model to investigate the trade-in service in a closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. In the supply chain, we consider two options for the trade-in service. The first one is Scenario M, in which the manufacturer collects the used products from trade-in customers by herself; and the second one is Scenario R, in which the manufacturer outsources the trade-in service to the retailer and obtains the used products from the retailer at a buy-back price. Accordingly, the firm in charge of the service needs to determine a rebate rate. We show that both firms prefer to operate the trade-in service by themselves in most cases, and we derive the condition for each firm to prefer a scenario and also the condition under which the supply chain is better off from a scenario. Compared to Scenario M, trade-in customers can enjoy lower prices in two periods in Scenario R, although the second-period sales price for new customers is higher. We also perform a numerical study to investigate the impacts of major parameters on the optimal prices, rebate rate, profits, and the conditions for each firm’s and the supply chain’s scenario preferences. The difference between trade-in prices in the two scenarios is larger when trade-in customers are more sensitive to the price, whereas the difference becomes smaller when the manufacturer obtains a higher net gain from handling returned products.