Minimum quality standards and consumers' information
Minimum quality standards and consumers' information
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DOI：
10.1007/s00199-007-0269-9
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发表时间：
2008-08-01
期刊：
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
Petrakis, Emmanuel
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Garella, Paolo G.;Petrakis, Emmanuel
到目前为止，文献分析了最低质量标准（MQS）在寡头垄断的影响，使用纯垂直差异模型，只有两个公司，和完美的信息。我们考虑的产品是横向和纵向差异化，与不完善的消费者的信息，和两个以上的公司。我们发现，MQS改变了消费者对产品质量的看法。这增加了公司从提高质量的投资中获得的回报，尽管有相反的战略效果。我们的分析证明了在消费者无法准确确定商品质量的行业中使用MQS的合理性，例如药品或涉及化学成分的产品。
The literature so far has analyzed the effects of minimum quality standards (MQS) in oligopoly, using models of pure vertical differentiation, with only two firms, and perfect information. We consider products that are differentiated horizontally and vertically, with imperfect consumers' information, and more than two firms. We show that a MQS changes the consumers' perception of produced qualities. This increases the firms' returns from quality enhancing investments, notwithstanding contrary strategic effects. Our analysis justifies the use of MQS in industries where consumers cannot precisely ascertain the quality of goods, for instance pharmaceuticals or products with chemical components involved.