Information Production and Capital Allocation: Decentralized vs. Hierarchical Firms
Information Production and Capital Allocation: Decentralized vs. Hierarchical Firms
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.227908
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发表时间：
2000-05
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Stein
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Stein
本文评估了不同组织形式在获取投资项目信息和有效配置投资项目资金方面的能力。当关于个别项目的信息是软的，不能可靠地传递时，小型、单一管理公司的分散方法最有可能具有吸引力。此外，在公司规模固定的情况下，软信息也有利于管理层较少的扁平化组织。相比之下，拥有多层管理的大型等级公司在信息可以无成本地“硬化”并在等级结构中传递时处于比较优势。作为该理论的具体应用，本文讨论了银行业整合的后果。有证据表明，当大银行收购小银行时，对小企业的贷款明显下降。在某种程度上，小企业贷款严重依赖于软信息，这正是该理论所导致的预期。
This paper assesses different organizational forms in terms of their ability to generate information about investment projects and allocate capital to these projects efficiently. A decentralized approach with small, single-manager firms is most likely to be attractive when information about individual projects is soft' and cannot be credibly transmitted. Moreover, holding fixed firm size, soft information also favors flatter organizations with fewer layers of management. In contrast, large hierarchical firms with multiple layers of management are at a comparative advantage when information can be costlessly hardened' and passed along within the hierarchy. As a concrete application of the theory, the paper discusses the consequences of consolidation in the banking industry. It has been documented that when large banks acquire small banks, there is a pronounced decline in lending to small businesses. To the extent that small-business lending relies heavily on soft information, this is exactly what the theory would lead one to expect.