Faultless Disagreement and Aesthetic Realism
Faultless Disagreement and Aesthetic Realism
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完美的分歧和审美现实主义
DOI：
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发表时间：
2011
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Karl Schafer
中科院分区：
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作者：
Karl Schafer
最近有人认为，某些话语领域，如关于品味问题的话语，涉及一种“完美的分歧”现象，这种现象排除了为它们提供标准现实主义或语境主义语义的可能性。因此，有人认为，我们别无选择，只能考虑这些领域更具冒险性的语义替代方案，例如涉及将真理相对于评估的观点或上下文的语义解释。我认为，在这些情况下出现的那种无可挑剔的分歧实际上与现实主义对其语义的处理是相容的。然后，我简要地考虑了其他可能被认为反对这些话语领域的现实主义的考虑。我的结论是，关于品味问题的现实主义远比今天大多数哲学家所认为的要可信得多（至少在某些情况下）。
It has recently been argued that certain areas of discourse, such as discourse about matters of taste, involve a phenomenon of ‘‘faultless disagreement’’ that rules out giving a standard realist or contextualist semantics for them. Thus, it is argued, we are left with no choice but to consider more adventurous semantic alternatives for these areas, such as a semantic account that involves relativizing truth to perspectives or contexts of assessment. I argue that the sort of faultless disagreement present in these cases is in fact compatible with a realist treatment of their semantics. Then I briefly consider other considerations that might be thought to speak against realism about these areas of discourse. I conclude with the tentative suggestion that realism about matters of taste is far more plausible (at least in some cases) than most philosophers believe today.