Transfer pricing regulation and tax competition
Transfer pricing regulation and tax competition
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jinteco.2020.103367
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发表时间：
2020-11-01
影响因子：
3.3
通讯作者：
Ishikawa, Jota
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Choi, Jay Pil;Furusawa, Taiji;Ishikawa, Jota
本文分析了跨国企业操纵内部转移价格以利用各国税收差异的动机，以及转移定价法规作为对抗这种利润转移的对策的意义。我们发现，税收激励的外国直接投资（FDI）可能导致内部生产效率低下，但可能使消费者受益。因此，鼓励转移定价行为在一定程度上可以提高社会福利。此外，我们考虑了两国之间的税收竞争，以探索其与转让定价法规的相互作用。我们表明，如果监管足够严格，FDI来源国将愿意设定更高的税率，并容忍一些利润转移到避税天堂国家。我们还指出了一种新的机制，即由较大的国家进行税收激励的外国直接投资，这是我们在现实中经常观察到的模式。(C) 2020作者。Elsevier B.V.出版
The paper analyzes multinational enterprises' incentives to manipulate internal transfer prices to take advantage of tax differences across countries, and implications of transfer-pricing regulations as a countermeasure against such profit shifting. We find that tax-motivated foreign direct investment (FDI) may entail inefficient internal production but may benefit consumers. Thus, encouraging transfer-pricing behavior to some extent can enhance social welfare. Furthermore, we consider tax competition between two countries to explore its interplay with transfer-pricing regulations. We show that the FDI source country will be willing to set a higher tax rate and tolerate some profit shifting to a tax haven country if the regulation is tight enough. We also indicate a novel mechanism through which it is the larger country that undertakes tax-motivated FDI, the pattern we often observe in reality. (C) 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V.