Equilibrium Selection inn-Person Coordination Games
Equilibrium Selection inn-Person Coordination Games
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平衡选择人协调游戏
DOI：
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发表时间：
1996
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Youngseo Kim
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Youngseo Kim
摘要 本文研究了几种平衡选择方法以及它们之间的关系。我们研究的博弈类别是具有多个帕累托可排序严格纳什均衡的 n 人广义协调博弈。主要结果是，所有选择标准在两人博弈中都选择相同的结果（即风险主导均衡），并且对于两名以上玩家的博弈，大多数等价性都会破裂。所有标准都选择投票博弈中的帕累托有效均衡，其中纯协调博弈是特例。经济文献杂志分类号：C70、C72、D82。
Abstract This paper investigates several approaches to equilibrium selection and the relationships between them. The class of games we study are n -person generalized coordination games with multiple Pareto rankable strict Nash equilibria. The main result is that all selection criteria select the same outcome (namely the risk dominant equilibrium) in two-person games, and that most equivalences break for games with more than two players. All criteria select the Pareto efficient equilibrium in voting games, of which pure coordination games are special cases. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72, D82.