Social welfare maximization with the least subsidy: Photovoltaic supply chain equilibrium and coordination with fairness concern
Social welfare maximization with the least subsidy: Photovoltaic supply chain equilibrium and coordination with fairness concern
复制标题
以最少补贴实现社会福利最大化：关注公平的光伏供应链均衡与协调
DOI：
10.1016/j.renene.2018.09.026
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发表时间：
2019-03-01
期刊：
影响因子：
8.7
通讯作者：
Su, Shong-Iee Ivan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Chen, Zhisong;Su, Shong-Iee Ivan
本研究试图填补光伏供应链研究中的文献空白，以更好地理解政府补贴政策下考虑公平性的光伏供应链的有效均衡和协调机制，以及如何确定最优补贴因子以实现社会福利最大化目标。在考虑政府补贴和供应链核心成员公平性的基础上，构建了四种基本的博弈模型（MS-leader Stackelberg Game、PA-leader Stackelberg Game、Nash Game和收益共享契约），研究并比较了均衡和协调供应链策略对解和绩效的影响。共开发了16个模型，用于分析和数值研究，发现和结果相互补充。研究发现，在公共部门和私营部门之间存在着一个冲突的目标，即发展一个更大、更健康的光伏产业。从理论上讲，一个协调的供应链将比一个均衡的供应链表现得更好，因为在光伏供应链中的协调策略允许使用最少的公共补贴的社会福利最大化，同时，产生更多的供应链利润的光伏供应链相比，这些供应链策略所赚取的利润没有任何补贴。解决公共部门和私营部门之间冲突的明智和适当的政策仍然非常不足，需要进行更多的实际调查。(C)2018爱思唯尔有限公司版权所有。
This study attempts to fill the literature gaps in the PV supply chain studies to understand better the effective equilibrium and coordination mechanisms in a PV supply chain with the fairness concern under the government subsidy policy and how an optimal subsidy factor is determined to achieve the social welfare maximization goal. Considering the government subsidy and the fairness concern of the core supply chain members, four basic game-theoretical model types (i.e. MS-leader Stackelberg Game, PA leader Stackelberg Game, Nash Game and Revenue Sharing Contract) are formulated to study and compare the effects on the solutions and the performances by undertaking either an equilibrium or a coordination supply chain strategy. A total of 16 models are developed for the analytical and numerical studies with the findings and results complementing each other. It is found that a conflicting goal exists between the public sector and the private sector to develop a larger and healthier PV industry. A coordinated supply chain, theoretically, would perform better than an equilibrium supply chain since a coordination strategy in a PV supply chain allows the maximization of the social welfare using the least public subsidy and, simultaneously, generates many more supply chain profits for the PV supply chain comparing to the profits earned by those supply chain strategies without any subsidy. Smart and proper policies to resolve the conflict between the public and the private sectors are still very deficient and need more practical investigations. (C) 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.