Asymmetric Information, Bargaining, and International Mergers
Asymmetric Information, Bargaining, and International Mergers
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信息不对称、讨价还价和国际并购
DOI：
10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00565.x
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发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Sarbajit Sengupta
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Satya P. Das;Sarbajit Sengupta
国际合并的形成是在两种不对称信息的存在下进行研究的，一种是当当地公司拥有关于市场规模的私人信息，另一种是当外国公司拥有关于其技术的私人信息。在每种情况下，参数配置确定下，合并要约可能会或可能不会。它还审查了要约的种类及其被接受的可能性。合并的可能性也与基本市场规模、需求不确定性和成本不确定性有关。东道国的税收/补贴政策的福利效应进行了分析。版权所有（c）2001马萨诸塞州理工学院。
The formation of international mergers is examined in the presence of two kinds of asymmetric information, one when a local firm has private information on market size and the other when a foreign firm has private information on its technology. In each situation, parametric configurations are identified under which a merger offer may or may not be made. It also examines the kind of offer and the probability of its acceptance. The likelihood of a merger beingformed is also related to the basic market size, demand uncertainty, and cost uncertainty. Welfare effects of tax/subsidy policies by the host country are also analyzed. Copyright (c) 2001 Massachusetts Institute of Technology.