Government Responsibility and Electoral Accountability in Federations
Government Responsibility and Electoral Accountability in Federations
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联邦中的政府责任和选举问责
DOI：
10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a005028
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发表时间：
2004
影响因子：
1.8
通讯作者：
F. Cutler
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
F. Cutler
由于联邦制可能对问责制构成威胁，因此联邦制中的投票行为模型必须适应选民对政府政策结果的责任归属。这项研究使用了一个小组调查的加拿大人在联邦和省级选举，问选民是否能够举行政府负责在联邦的背景下。选民可能会忽视责任不清的问题，他们可能会在同等程度上奖励或惩罚联邦和省政府，或者管辖权的混乱可能会使他们对政府甚至政治制度产生反感。在2000年联邦选举或2001年阿尔伯塔省和不列颠哥伦比亚省的选举中，将医疗保健问题归咎于两国政府的加拿大人并没有将这一判断用于投票决定，而那些能够确定主要责任的人则这样做了。联邦制和政府间决策可能会降低选民对政府问责的能力。版权所有2004年，牛津大学出版社。
Because federalism can be a threat to accountability, a model of voting behavior in federations must accommodate voters' attributions of responsibility to each order of government for policy outcomes. This study uses a panel survey of Canadians in both federal and provincial elections to ask whether voters are able to hold governments accountable in a federal context. Voters may ignore issues where responsibility is unclear, they may reward or punish both the federal and provincial governments to the same degree, or the confusion of jurisdiction may sour them on the government or even the political system. Canadians who blamed both governments for problems in health care did not lake this judgment to their voting decision in either the 2000 federal election or the 2001 elections in Alberta and British Columbia, while those who could identify primary responsibility did so. Federalism and intergovernmental policymaking may reduce voters' ability to hold their governments accountable. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.