Bankrupting Sybil Despite Churn
Bankrupting Sybil Despite Churn
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DOI:
10.1109/icdcs51616.2021.00048
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发表时间:
2020-10
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Diksha Gupta;Jared Saia;Maxwell Young
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文献类型:
--
作者:
Diksha Gupta;Jared Saia;Maxwell Young
A Sybil attack occurs when an adversary pretends to be multiple identities (IDs). Limiting the number of Sybil (bad) IDs to a minority is critical to the use of well-established tools for tolerating malicious behavior, such as Byzantine agreement and secure multiparty computation. A popular technique for enforcing a Sybil minority is resource burning: verifiable consumption of a network resource, such as computational power, bandwidth, or memory. Unfortunately, typical defenses based on resource burning require non-Sybil (good) IDs to consume at least as many resources as the adversary. Additionally, they have a high cost, even when the system membership is relatively stable. Here, we present a new Sybil defense, ERGO, that guarantees (1) there is always a minority of Sybil IDs; and (2) when the system is under significant attack, the good IDs consume asymptotically less than the bad. In particular, for churn rate that can vary exponentially, the resource burning rate of ERGO is, where is the resource burning rate of the adversary, and is the join rate of good IDs. We empirically evaluate ERGO alongside prior Sybil defenses. Unlike other Sybil defense, ERGO can be combined with machine learning techniques for identifying Sybil IDs, in a way that maintains its theoretical guarantees. Based on our experiments comparing ERGO with two state-of-the-art Sybil defenses, we show that ERGO improves by up to 2 orders of magnitude without machine learning, and up to 3 orders of magnitude using machine learning.