Corruption and the shadow economy
Corruption and the shadow economy
复制标题
腐败与影子经济
DOI：
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
F. Schneider
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Dreher;F. Schneider
本文建立了一个简单的框架来分析腐败与非官方经济之间的联系及其对官方经济的影响。在一个包含不同企业家的自我选择模型中，我们表明，企业家逃往地下经济的选择限制了腐败官员为谋取私利而扭曲经济的能力。因此，非官方经济减轻了政府造成的扭曲，结果导致官方部门的经济活动得到加强。从这个意义上说，非官方部门的存在是对官方经济的补充，而不是替代。
This paper develops a simple framework to analyze the links between corruption and the unofficial economy and their implications for the official economy. In a model of self-selection with heterogeneous entrepreneurs, we show that the entrepreneurs’ option to flee to the underground economy constrains a corrupt official’s ability to introduce distortions to the economy for private gains. The unofficial economy thus mitigates government-induced distortions and, as a result, leads to enhanced economic activities in the official sector. In this sense, the presence of the unofficial sector acts as a complement to the official economy rather than a substitute.