Dual Aspect Theory
Dual Aspect Theory
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双方面理论
DOI：
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发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Maloney
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文献类型：
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作者：
J. Maloney
卡拉瑟斯提出了一个微妙的倾向主义的再现高阶理论有关的现象性格。该理论将无意识的运动管理与有意识的态度管理区分为感知过程。每个过程都将感知表征作为输入。一个受态度管理影响的表征倾向于诱导一个更高层次的表征，它确保了其内容的自我指涉方面，据推测，这一方面决定了现象特征。不幸的是，该帐户需要一个有问题的认知模糊性，同时未能解释为什么态度，而不是运动，管理，决定性格。此外，态度管理的正常变化与现象特征的典型恒定性相冲突。尽管一个行动者被剥夺了对一个场景的知觉接触，而她在其他方面对这个场景是很了解的，那么她就不会遭受任何现象性的性格，但意向主义理论却得出了相反的结论。这样的问题，连同前面几章的结果，表明，无论是在意向主义或更高层次的理论掩盖下，表征主义错误的性质的内容。
Carruthers proposes a subtle dispositionalist rendition of higher order theory regarding phenomenal character. The theory would distinguish unconscious movement management from conscious attitude management as perceptual processes. Each process takes perceptual representations as inputs. A representation subject to attitude management is apt to induce a higher order representation of itself that secures a self-referential aspect of its content supposedly determinative of phenomenal character. Unfortunately, the account requires a problematic cognitive ambiguity while failing to explain why attitude, but not movement, management, determines character. Moreover, normal variation in attitudinal management conflicts with the constancy typical of phenomenal character. And although an agent denied perceptual access to a scene about which she is otherwise well informed would suffer no phenomenal character, dispositionalist theory entails otherwise. Such problems, together with the results of the previous chapters, suggest that, whether cloaked under intentionalism or higher order theory, representationalism mistakes content for character.